

Derailment with Airport Express train

RAIIF Taiwan 21 - 24 October 2025

Mikael Hillbo, Senior Investigator Rail Swedish Accident Investigation Authority



The accident

- May 27, 2023, at 4:35 AM
- At Blackvreten on A-Train AB's infrastructure
- The mornings first Arlanda Express train from Stockholm towards Arlanda airport
- 67 passengers onboard
- Driver and train attendant
- The train derailed at 178 km/h (110 mph)
- 900 meters before the train stopped
- One passenger suffered serious injuries



Surveillance camera


- A surveillance camera recorded the passing train
- · Derailment occurred from axle seven
- Heavy smoke development from crushed ballast and concrete
- The derailed vehicles bounced over the subsequent switches












Rescue operation

- The derailment occurred at 04:35 AM
- Call to emergency call service at 04:39
- Initially unclear location for the rescue services
- The first unit arrived at the gates of the adjacent depot at 04:53
- The rescue operation started at 05:05
- The serious injured person was transported by air ambulance
- The rescue operation was concluded at 06:26



Accident Site Investigation

- Major damage to the derailed vehicles, but none that caused the derailment
- Significant damage to 900 meters of track and switches
- Bogie design guided the left rail
- In switch 106 with movable crossing point – the crossing tip was in a middle position
- Marks parallel to the crossing where the right wheels had left the right rail














The drive connection plate beneath the moving crossing had broken




Drive connection plate

- A plate with two 90-degree brackets
- The brackets are welded to the plate
- Transfers force from the switch motor and pull rods to the movable crossing point
- Safety-critical function







A serious fault!

- A similar construction used in 135 switches within the Swedish Transport Administration's infrastructure
- Risk of systemic failure
- The investigator called the NSA emergency line decision to have a video meeting to present facts from the accident site
- The Swedish Transport Administration (largest Infrastructure Manager in Sweden) inspected all their corresponding drive connection plates




Metallurgical investigation






- The welds exhibited extensive fatigue cracks
- Final fracture in only half of the last weld
- Lack of fusion in the root of the four butt welds
- The welds were undersized compared to the drawing's specified 5 mm and did not meet the manufacturer's stated standard
- Lack of fusion also in the reference switch 103, but without signs of fatigue or cracks




Supplementary site visit and in-depth investigation

- Review of the crossing section together with our appointed metallurgical expert and specialists from the Swedish Transport Administration
- In-depth investigation of the crossing section in our workshop
- Molding of the plates under the moving crossing for microscope examination
- Diagonal marks on the plates clearly indicates the presence of movement and dynamics in the moving crossing



Switch typ EV<u>R</u>-60E1-300-1:9

- Developed for the Arlanda Line between 2006 and 2008 to replace switches with high wear in fixed crossings
- Declaration that the switch met the applicable European standards for interoperability
- Approved for 200 km/h
- The drive connection plate was designed and dimensioned solely for static load and to last the entire lifetime of the switch
- Two switches delivered to A-Train AB, later nine switches to the Swedish Transport Administrations infrastructure



Maintenance

- Continuous high wear with moving crossing
- No track geometry faults outside applicable requirements
- Safety inspections six times per year and maintenance according to the Swedish Transport Administration's and manufacturer's instructions
- The drive connection plate and its welds were hidden under the crossing - no specific inspections was required
- Replacement of the drive connection plate in 2015 due to wear in the pull rod fastening holes
- Installation of bushings in the pull rod holes in 2017, re-bushing in 2020



Conclusions and causes of the accident

- The direct cause of the derailment was the displacement of the movable crossing due to the failure of the weld joints on the drive connection plate
- Dynamic load cases from passing wheels and axles had caused fatigue cracks in the weld joints of the drive connection plate
- At the system level, the drive connection plate was not designed for the load cases and conditions present in switch 106
- Additionally, the rules and procedures for safety inspections and maintenance were not designed to identify and address deficiencies in the weld joints of the drive connection plate

Recommendations

A-Train AB:

 Given the previous high wear, maintenance and damage to the old types of switches: monitor wear and maintenance in the new type of switch to proactively identify potential deficiencies

Recommendations

Vossloh Switch Systems AB:

- Investigate whether weld joints in newly manufactured drive connection plates should be dimensioned for dynamic load cases to minimize the risk of fatigue cracks and fractures
- Review and follow up on rules and procedures to ensure that welding work meets requirements and standards

Recommendations

Swedish Transport Administration:

- Examine drive connection plates using volumetric testing to ensure that the weld joints meet established requirements and to detect any hidden defects in load-bearing welds
- Review governing documents to ensure that weld joints in drive connection plates for movable crossings within the Swedish Transport Administration's infrastructure are inspected to the required extent to minimize the risks of fatigue cracks and fractures

Recommendations

Swedish Transport Administration:

• In consultation with the Swedish emergency call service, develop a method to quickly determine the location of a railway accident. The work should focus on ensuring that the Swedish Transport Administration, in connection with the initial information about the accident, can provide and communicate a position that emergency resources can reference.