Releases Final Report of Kaohsiung fishing boat SINYIPU NO.36 Major Transportation Occurrence Investigation
The Taiwan Transportation Safety Board (TTSB) releases the Final Report on the investigation of Kaohsiung fishing boat SINYIPU NO.36 Occurrence Investigation.
On 20 August 2019, a Kaohsiung fishing boat SINYIPU NO.36 proceeded to fishing operations near the northwest of Wanggong fishing port, Changhua County. Because the fishing nets were tangled, the Master steered his ship southwest, where there were fewer ships, to untie the nets. On 21 August 2019, a container vessel MARCLIFF left Taichung Port and steered to its destination Kaohsiung Port after finishing cargo handling at Taichung Port. While the Chief Officer was on coastal navigation duty, using radar backup to look out, the vessel collided with the stern of SINYIPU NO.36 resulting in capsize of the ship.
According to the related content of Transportation Occurrence Investigation Act ROC and International Maritime Organization’s Casualty Investigation Code, Taiwan Transportation Safety Board is an independent organization to be in charge of the marine occurrence investigation. The invited agencies to participate in this investigation included: Maritime and Port Bureau, MOTC, Coast Guard Administration, Ocean Affairs Council and Fisheries Agency, Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan.
Findings Related to Probable Causes:
1. When the Chief Officer was on duty on the Navigation Bridge of MARCLIFF, he didn’t maintain the correct lookout according to the regulation article 5, International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. When he used collision avoidance radar as an auxiliary lookout, he put the audible warning sound of the radar on silent. Thus there wasn’t any warning sound when their ship came close to SINYIPU and brought about the accident.
2. The Captain of SINYIPU didn’t follow the Navigation Article 5, International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea to maintain the correct lookout before he shut down and drifted the ship so that he didn’t realize the danger of the situation and the risk of collision. When he was conscious that MARCLIFF was approaching, he didn’t obey the regulation article 17, International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. In addition when the collision was not avoidable, he didn’t take most advantageous step to use the engine at once to avoid the ship being collided and turned over.
Findings Related to Risk：
1. The Captain and officer on watch ignored the alarm sound of collision avoidance radar on the navigation bridge set to the minimum and they also ignored the Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System was shut down.
2. The on-duty Chief officer of MARCLIFF on the Navigation Bridge didn’t keep watching the radar to proceed to look out. It didn’t conform to the related regulations of “lookout” and “navigational watch” on “mandatory standards” in Chapter A, International Convention on STCW. The Chief officer didn’t use vision and hearing to respond to the environmental variation to look out. He didn’t find out the risk of collision and it didn’t conform to the regulation “Proper Lookout” of International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.
3. When the ship was berthed, the Chief officer should take charge of cargo handling operation and he should keep steering the ship and continue his navigational watch after finishing his job. Yet the sailor who was supposed to be on duty at the same time assigned by the Captain to carry out maintenance work. Therefore the Chief officer took the risk of coastal sailing lookout alone on Navigation Bridge.
4. The Captain didn’t perform his duty to fill out “Night Order Book” for the onduty officer on watch to follow from the time he took over the boat till the accident had happened for 7 days and passed 3 harbors.
1. The course recorder didn’t conform to the course during the accident. It indicated that the course recorder didn’t turn on before the ship left the port. The discipline of Bridge Resource Management wasn’t perfect.
Transportation Safety Recommendations
To MarConsultSchiffahrt (GmbH & Co.) KG :
1.The ship’s owner should demand his crew pay more attention to check and inspect the Bridge Resources and avoid the situation to set up the radar alarm to the minimum and the alarm system shut down.
2. The importance of continuous safety sailing should be strongly advised and the crew should have accurate lookout during the sailing.
3. The ship company should supervise the performance of safety management system and review the results of evaluation.
Full Final Report is in Chinese only and available for download at https://www.ttsb.gov.tw
Vivi Yang, Executive Officer