The Taiwan Transportation Safety Board (TTSB) published the Final Report on the investigation of Collision between Container Ship UNI-PREMIER and Tugboat TIPM No. 14402 in Kaohsiung Port.

On August 1, 2021, Panama registered container ship UNI-PREMIER (GT 17887, IMO No.9202223) collided with Tugboat TIPM No. 14402 at 0505 hours when it passed the VTS tower of Kaohsiung Port and turned to starboard in the turning basin. Tug 14402 was damaged on the starboard side, with water leaking into the boat. The crew members on both vessels were unharmed, and no environmental pollution resulted.

In accordance with the Transportation Occurrences Investigation Act, R.O.C., and IMO CI Code, the Taiwan Transportation Safety Board was the independent agency in charge of investigating the marine casualty. The agencies (institutions) invited to participate in the investigation include the Maritime and Port Bureau, MOTC, Taiwan International Ports Corporation Ltd., Evergreen Marine Co., Ltd., TIPC Marine Co., Ltd., All Ports Transportation Co., Ltd., and Pilot Office of Kaohsiung Port. This final report was reviewed and approved by the 48th TTSB Board meeting on March 3, 2023, and published on April 13rd, 2023.

Findings

Findings related to probable causes

1. Under unfavorable weather conditions, the pilot was insufficiently vigilant when monitoring the environment around the vessels. The maneuver in the harbor was slightly hasty, signifying that the pilot was unconfident about his navigation ability. Consequently, the instruction given to Tug 14402 prior to the incident was inadequate. No plan was made before UNI-PREMIER entered the port as to how the tugboat would assist with the maneuver. This ultimately led to the collision incident during berthing.
2. The heavy rain on the night of the incident reduced the visibility of the UNI-PREMIER and Tug 14402. However, both entities did not use their radar to observe the surrounding environment or make adequate decisions to avoid the collision. This resulted in the collision of the two vessels.
3. The bow heading of UNI-PREMIER quickly turned to starboard. The vessel speed increased from 6.3 to 7.0 knots. While UNI-PREMIER made a rapid turn to starboard, it collided with the starboard side of Tug 14402.
4. Tug 14402 sailed forward without confirming the location of UNI-PREMIER. It stopped and waited on the course where UNI-PREMIER was turning to starboard. This maneuver by Tug 14402 was risky and did not comply with the general navigation safety conduct at night.

Findings related to risk

1. After the pilot boarded UNI-PREMIER, its position relative to the tugboat required further confirmation. However, the pilot did not prioritize the safety of the tugboat and gave inappropriate instructions. The maneuver was hasty and inadequate.
2. UNI-PREMIER was affected by instantaneous wind pressure when its bow quickly shifted toward the port side. This resulted in the pilot ordering subsequent commands (i.e., full ahead, hard starboard, and full starboard) and hurrying Tug 14402 to assist UNI-PREMIER.
3. The heading of UNI-PREMIER quickly turned to port, putting Tug 14402 near the starboard side of UNI-PREMIER. This change of relation position was caused by UNI-PREMIER deviating from its course instead of the movement of the tugboat.
4. The UNI-PREMIER did not comply with the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, which state that vessels should sound their horn when visibility is low. Consequently, UNI-PREMIER did not warn the tugboat through sound or light.
5. VTS did not continually monitor the status of UNI-PREMIER during the low-visibility period or provide real-time safety information to Tug 14402 and UNI-PREMIER. Consequently, it failed to warn both vessels before the collision.
6. Currently, VTS are instructed to switch to another monitor target once the pilot has boarded a vessel and all safety items have been verified. However, this practice is inadequate and does not follow IMO guideline regarding the responsibility of VTS for monitoring vessel traffic.
7. The VTS lacks clear instructions on the monitoring of vessel movement. It does not specify rules for monitoring vessels that navigate in low-visibility conditions.

Other findings

1. After the pilot hastily requested assistance from Tug 14402, the heading of UNI-PREMIER was quickly stabilized and turning to starboard within two minutes. This short period required by UNI-PREMIER to complete the correction of its course indicated that the vessel would be able to safely and quickly return to its course without the assistance from Tug 14402.
2. The incident was mainly caused by the inappropriate maneuver of the two vessels and was not related to the berthing of a large vessel assisted by a tugboat.
3. Professional training provided to pilots in Taiwan does not include the continual improvement of professional abilities or the updating of knowledge. In addition, it does not comply with relevant IMO regulations on pilot training.

Safety Recommendations

To Pilot Office of Kaohsiung Port

1. Regulations that comply with international standards should be formulated to supervise pilots and ensure their compliance with relevant collaboration principles adopted in bridge resource management. When visibility is low, relevant personnel should use radar and other navigation instruments to ensure the safety of vessels.（TTSB-MSR-23-04-001）

To TIPC Marine Co., Ltd.

1. Crew training should be enhanced to remind crew members to use radar and electronic nautical charts when undertaking berthing operations during poor weather. This can ensure that all vessels are fully aware of their surrounding environment and safe when they navigate in a port.
   （TTSB-MSR-23-04-002）

To Taiwan International Ports Corporation Ltd.

1. Changes should be made to the current practice in which VTS operator switch to another monitor target once the pilot has boarded a vessel and all safety items have been verified. Current rationales regarding the monitoring of vessels moving in ports should be revised to meet relevant safety and professional expectations. （TTSB-MSR-23-04-003）
2. The ability of VTS operators in each port should be assessed, and relevant training should be improved. This enables the operators to provide safety information to moving vessels at any time; collect, analyze, and interpret data in an adequate manner; and respond appropriately to emergency situations to ensure port safety. （TTSB-MSR-23-04-004）
3. A review of regulations on vessels entering or existing a port indicates that visibility in ports must be considered in subsequent amendments to the regulations. Please refer to IMO Resolution A.857(20) to create relevant training manuals and implement training. （TTSB-MSR-23-04-005）

To Maritime and Port Bureau, MOTC

1. Affiliated pilots should be under supervision to ensure that their maneuvers comply with the relevant collaboration principles adopted in bridge resource management. When visibility is low, pilots should fully utilize radars and other navigation equipment on the vessel to ensure navigation safety. （TTSB-MSR-23-04-006）
2. Necessary knowledge and training content for pilots should be referenced from global practices of in-service pilot training and Annex 1 of IMO Resolution A.960(23) and incorporated in subsequent amendments to the Pilotage Law of Taiwan, thereby ensuring that pilots are familiar and updated with the latest knowledge and professional skills. （TTSB-MSR-23-04-007）
3. Refresher training should be planned for pilots (excluding pilots with 5 years of experience or longer), in addition to in-service training, to ensure the professionalism of pilots. Pilots should continually refine their professional skills and update their knowledge to ensure that their professionalism is of the highest international standards and ensure the safety of vessels navigating in the international commercial ports of Taiwan. （TTSB-MSR-23-04-008）
4. Relevant authorities should fulfill their responsibility to supervise the navigation quality of pilots, continually oversee the efficiency of pilotage and relevant operations, formulate reward and punitive mechanisms for pilots, and implement an employment separation system for pilots, thereby ensuring the safety of vessels navigating and berthing in domestic ports. （TTSB-MSR-23-04-009）

Vivi Yang, Secretariat Office
Tel: +886-2-7727-6217
E-mail: viviy2314@ttsb.gov.tw