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Sinyipu No.36 Fishing Boat Major Marine Occurrence


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Category
Collision
ShipType
Fishing Boat
Date
2019-08-21
Area
9 nm off Wang-gong

Description

On 20 August 2019, a Kaohsiung fishing boat Sinyipu NO.36 proceeded to fishing operations near the northwest of Wanggong fishing port, Changhua County. At 2000, the shipowner steered his ship southeast where there were fewer ships to deal with his fishing tools because the tools got tied and he couldn’t let down his nets to fish.    


On 21 August 2019, a container vessel MARCLIFF left Taichung Port and steered to its destination Kaohsiung Port at 0606 after finishing cargo handling at Taichung Port. At 0518, the ship hit the stern of Sinyipu NO.36 resulting in overturn accident at 0742 while the Chief Officer was on coastal navigation duty, using radar backup to look out.


On 21 August 2019, at 1000, the Central Maritime Affairs Center, Maritime and Port Bureau, MOTC received the report of Assignment Command Center, Coast Guard Administration that Sinyipu NO.36 overturned at 9 Nautical miles offshore at Wanggong Port, Fangyuan Township, Changhua County. On receiving the report, the Central Maritime Affairs Center instantly started up emergency response to notify to the passing ships. Budai Coast Patrol Corps, Coast Guard Administration sent the patrol boat PP-2058 at 1022 and they stopped the suspected accident-caused vessel MARCLIFF at 10 Nautical miles outside Foziliao fishing port, Yunlin County.  After they found out the destination of MARCLIFF is Kaohsiung Port, the Corps asked South Maritime Affairs Center, Maritime and Port Bureau, MOTC to restric its departure and carry out the marine safety investigation


According to the related content of Transportation Occurance Investigation Act ROC and International Maritime Organization’s Casualty Investigation Code, Taiwan Transportation Safety Board is an independent organization to be in charge of the marine occurance investigation. The invited agencies to participate in this investigation included: Maritime and Port Burear, MOTC, Coast Guard Administration, Ocean Affairs Council and Fisheries Agency, Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan.


Based on the factual information and the results of analysis, 7 findings and 3 safety recommendations were issued as follows.    


Definitions of the findings as the result of this investigation: The TTSB presents the findings derived from the factual information gathered during the investigation and the analysis of the occurrence. The findings are presented in three categories: findings related to probable causes, findings related to risk, and other findings.


The findings related to probable causes identify elements that have been shown to have operated in the occurrence, or almost certainly operated in the occurrence. These findings are associated with unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or safety deficiencies associated with safety significant events that played a major role in the circumstances leading to the occurrence.


The findings related to risk identify elements of risk that have the potential to degrade transportation safety. Some of the findings in this category identify unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, and safety deficiencies including organizational and systemic risks, that made this occurrence more likely; however, they cannot be clearly shown to have operated in the occurrence alone. Furthermore, some of the findings in this category identify risks that are unlikely to be related to the occurrence but, nonetheless, were safety deficiencies that may warrant future safety actions.


Other findings identify elements that have the potential to enhance transportation safety, resolve a controversial issue, or clarify an ambiguity point which remains to be resolved. Some of these findings are of general interests that are often included in the IMO format accident reports for informational, safety awareness, education, and improvement purposes.

Investigation Found

    About Possible Causes
    1. When the Chief officer was on duty on the Navigation Bridge of MARCLIFF, he didn’t maintain the correct lookout according to the regulation article 5, International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. When he used collision avoidance radar as an auxiliary lookout, he put the audible warning sound of the radar on silent.  Thus there wasn’t any warning sound when their ship came close to Sinyipu and brought about the accident.
    2. The Captain of Sinyipu didn’t follow the Navigation Article 5, International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea to maintain the correct lookout before he shut down and drifted the ship so that he didn’t realize the danger of the situation and the risk of collision.  When he was conscious that MARCLIFF  was approaching, he didn’t obey the regulation article 17, International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. In addition when the collision was not avoidable, he didn’t take most advantageous step to use the engine at once to avoid the ship being collided and turned over.     

    About Risk
    1. The Captain and officer on watch ignored the alarm sound of collision avoidance radar on the navigation bridge set to the minimum and they also ignored the Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System was shut down.  
    2. The on-duty Chief officer of MARCLIFF on the Navigation Bridge didn’t keep watching the radar to proceed to look out. It didn’t conform to the related regulations of “lookout” and “navigational watch” on “mandatory standards” in  Chapter A, International Convention on STCW.  The Chief officer didn’t use vision and hearing to respond to the environmental variation to look out.  He didn’t find out the risk of collision and it didn’t conform to the regulation “Proper Lookout” of International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.   
    3. When the ship was berthed, the Chief officer should take charge of cargo handling operation and he should keep steering the ship and continue his navigational watch after finishing his job. Yet the sailor who was supposed to be on duty at the same time assigned by the Captain to carry out maintenance work.  Therefore the Chief officer took the risk of  coastal sailing lookout alone on Navigation Bridge. 
    4. The Captain didn’t perform his duty to fill out “Night Order Book” for the on-duty officer on watch to follow from the time he took over the boat till the accident had happened for 7 days and passed 3 harbors. 

    Other
    1. The course recorder didn’t conform to the course during the accident.  It indicated that the course recorder didn’t turn on before the ship left the port.  The  discipline of Bridge Resource Management wasn’t perfect. 

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