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SHENG LI Cargo Vessel Major Marine Occurrence


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Category
Grounding
ShipType
Container ship/Bulk carrier /Dry cargo ship
Date
2018-08-01
Area
0.4 nm from Budai port

Description

On August 1, 2019, at 1205 hour, the cargo vessel Sheng Li owned by Jamin Marine Transport Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Jamin), with a Captain and 6 crewmembers on board, left Longmen Jianshan Port, Penghu County, destined for Budai Port, Chiayi County. The Sheng Li was loaded with general cargos, scrap iron, and more than ten empty containers. The Sheng Li came into Budai Port at the lowest tide of the day at 15:10. Due to the insufficient under keel clearance, the Sheng Li was stranded and abandoned.


According to the Republic of China ROC Transportation Occurrence Investigation Act and the relevant content of the Casualty Investigation Code of the International Maritime Organization, the Taiwan Transportation Safety Board TTSB, an independent transportation occurrence investigation agency, is responsible for conducting the investigation. The investigation team also included members from Maritime and Port Bureau, Ministry of Transportation and Communications, South Maritime Affairs Center, Budai District Office, Port of Kaohsiung, Taiwan International Ports Corporation, Ltd. and Jamin Marine Transport Co., Ltd.


The draft “Final Report” of the occurrence investigation was completed in December 2019. In accordance with the procedure, it was reviewed at 8th Board Meeting of TTSB’s on 7th February 2020 and distributed to relevant organizations and authorities for comments. After comments were collected and integrated, the Final Report was reviewed and approved by TTSB’s 12th Board Meeting on 5th Jun 2020. The Final Report was published on 18th Jun 2020.


Based on the factual information gathered during the investigation process and the results of analysis, 5 findings were obtained and 3 safety recommendations for improvement were issued to the related organizations as follows.


Definitions of the findings as the result of this investigation: The TTSB presents the findings derived from the factual information gathered during the investigation and the analysis of the occurrence. The findings are presented in three categories: findings related to probable causes, findings related to risk, and other findings.


The findings related to probable causes identify elements that have been shown to have operated in the occurrence, or almost certainly operated in the occurrence. These findings are associated with unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or safety deficiencies associated with safety significant events that played a major role in the circumstances leading to the occurrence.


The findings related to risk identify elements of risk that have the potential to degrade transportation safety. Some of the findings in this category identify unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, and safety deficiencies including organizational and systemic risks, that made this occurrence more likely; however, they cannot be clearly shown to have operated in the occurrence alone. Furthermore, some of the findings in this category identify risks that are unlikely to be related to the occurrence but, nonetheless, were safety deficiencies that may warrant future safety actions.


Other findings identify elements that have the potential to enhance transportation safety, resolve a controversial issue, or clarify an ambiguity point which remains to be resolved. Some of these findings are of general interests that are often included in the IMO format accident reports for informational, safety awareness, education, and improvement purposes.

Investigation Found

    About Possible Causes
    1. At the time of the accident, the Budai Management Office has just completed the establishment of the port monitoring system, but the office has neither established a ship control mechanism and policies, and nor control the Sheng Li into the port during the period of the lowest tide at the maximum high tide of the year, As a result the Sheng Li was stranded due to insufficient under keel clearance.

    About Risk
    1. Because of the drastic changes in water depth after dredging, the information about channel water depth released by the Budai Management Office was not accurate enough as a reference for sailing ships.
    2. Jamin did not comply with Article 4 of the “Regulations Governing Safe Operation and Pollution Prevention of Vessels”. Under the provisions, when performing safety management tasks the safety management agencies shall work towards the following goals:
      1. Provide a safe operating system and a safe working environment for ship operations.
      2. Assess the hazards to ship navigation and life safety, prevent ship pollution, and adopt appropriate preventive measures.

      3. Improve the safety management skills of safety management agencies and ship personnel, including preparations for ship navigation, safety of life, and prevention of ship pollution emergencies.​


    Other
    1. The depth of water on the north side of the channel in Budai Port is deeper than that of the south side. Although the captain has taken measures to sail close to the north side, the ship was still stranded.
    2. A variety of factors have caused difficulties for dredging the channel and the silting has become increasingly serious. The Budai Management Office plans to find a more suitable dredging method to solve the problem.

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