GODSPEED Dry Cargo Vessel Major Marine Occurrence-Taiwan Transportation Safety Board

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GODSPEED Dry Cargo Vessel Major Marine Occurrence

Description

On March 9, 2020, a Hong Kong registered dry cargo vessel GODSPEED, owned by Creativity Dragon Holding Limited and managed by Fujian Xinan Shipping Co., Ltd, International Maritime Organization number 9426738, gross tonnage 5272, with 1 captain and 19 crew members totally 20 people on board, departed from Taichung Port for Taipei Port at 1420. While entering the breakwater of Taipei Port, the GODSPEED collided with pilot boat Yonghua No. 6 (hereafter referred to as the Yonghua), owned by Shun Fa Motorboat, at 2024, causing the Yonghua to capsize and sink with loss of two lives.

On the day before the occurrence, the GODSPEED contacted the Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) at Taipei Port to complete registration procedures and thereafter contacted the Taipei Port pilot station, from which she received a response to pick up a pilot after entering the breakwater at 2015. The Captain of the GODSPEED arrived on the bridge 5 miles from the breakwater entrance to take control of the vessel and entered the breakwater entrance at a speed of 8 knots. After the GODSPEED entered the breakwater, the Yonghua transported the pilot who embarked on the GODSPEED from the port side and departed from the port side of the GODSPEED. The pilot arrived on the bridge of the GODSPEED and talked with the Captain about the vessel’s berth. At 2024:21, the chief officer stationed at the bow noticed that the Yonghua stopped in front of the GODSPEED and he attempted to notify the bridge by radio. At 2024:27, the chief officer notified the bridge that a collision with the Yonghua had occurred.

The Captain of the GODSPEED immediately stopped the vessel after the bridge was notified that the Yonghua had capsized because of the collision. Simultaneously, the pilot reported the collision to the Taipei Port VTS and requested support from an approaching tugboat, the Coast Guard, the Harbor Police, and the Harbor Fire Station. The Yonghua crew member was found at 2151 that evening, and the Yonghua Captain was found the next morning at 0833; both persons were already deceased. The collision caused total loss of the Yonghua, the GODSPEED did not sustain substantial damage, hull paint was peeled off only. This event caused no environmental pollution within the harbor.

Pursuant to the Republic of China’s Transportation Occurrences Investigation Act and the International Maritime Organization’s Casualty Investigation Code, the Taiwan Transportation Safety Board (hereafter referred to as the TTSB), an independent transportation occurrence investigation agency, was responsible for investigating this transportation occurrence. Organizations or agencies been invited to participate in the investigation included the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Maritime and Port Bureau of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Taiwan International Ports Corporation (hereafter referred to as the TIPC), the Coast Guard Administration of the Ocean Affairs Council, the Taipei Port Pilot Office, Shun Fa Motorboat, and Fujian Xinan Shipping Co., Ltd.

The draft of the occurrence report was completed in May 2021, and in accordance with procedure, was submitted to the 26th TTSB Committee Meeting on June 4, 2021, for preliminary review and revision, and then to the relevant agencies to collect their opinions. After compilation of all relevant opinions, the occurrence report was approved by the 30th TTSB Committee Meeting on September 3, 2021, and published on September 15, 2021.

Based upon the factual information gathered during the investigation process and the results of analysis, 10 investigation findings and 12 safety recommendations were obtained as follows.

Definitions of the findings as the result of this investigation: The TTSB presents the findings derived from the factual information gathered during the investigation and the analysis of the occurrence. The findings are presented in three categories: findings related to probable causes, findings related to risk, and other findings.

The findings related to probable causes identify elements that have been shown to have operated in the occurrence, or almost certainly operated in the occurrence. These findings are associated with unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, or safety deficiencies associated with safety significant events that played a major role in the circumstances leading to the occurrence.

The findings related to risk identify elements of risk that have the potential to degrade transportation safety. Some of the findings in this category identify unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, and safety deficiencies including organizational and systemic risks, that made this occurrence more likely; however, they cannot be clearly shown to have operated in the occurrence alone. Furthermore, some of the findings in this category identify risks that are unlikely to be related to the occurrence but, nonetheless, were safety deficiencies that may warrant future safety actions.

Other findings identify elements that have the potential to enhance transportation safety, resolve a controversial issue, or clarify an ambiguity point which remains to be resolved. Some of these findings are of general interests that are often included in the International Maritime Organization format accident reports for informational, safety awareness, education, and improvement purposes.

Stage

Investigation Found

About Possible Causes

1. After the pilot boarded the GODSPEED, the Yonghua did not comply with the rule to cruise at a reduced speed, and shall not sail alongside or overtake other ships, or obstruct the navigation of other ships. In the dark night, the Yonghua approached the GODSPEED’s course and overtook it. After the pilot had boarded, the GODSPEED accelerated and heading turned to the port side. As a result, the distance between the two ships reduced gradually and crossing the tracking vectors. The controller of vessel traffic service failed to monitor the dynamic status of both ships at that time and issued an early warning in time.
2. The on-duty crew on the bridge of the GODSPEED did not keep proper look-out, and failed to use radar or electronic chart systems to maintain awareness of their surrounding situation. At least 10 seconds before the collision, as the chief officer of the GODSPEED noticed that the Yonghua was approaching the GODSPEED, the navigator of the Yonghua should also have noticed the GODSPEED approaching from the starboard side. However, neither the GODSPEED nor the Yonghua had sufficient time to react, resulting in the Yonghua colliding with the GODSPEED and subsequently capsizing.

About Risk

1. The pilot involved in the occurrence did not adhere to the guide to Taipei Port entry, which were to exit the harbor and wait outside the breakwater to guide the GODSPEED into port. The pilot also failed to follow the controller’s operation manual of Taipei Port, which were to instruct the GODSPEED to place a pilot ladder on the leeward side (in this case, starboard) which might increase the risks to safe navigation within the harbor. The Taipei Port controllers did not comply with the procedures as specified in the manual to remind the pilot to exit the harbor and board the GODSPEED from the leeward side to conduct pilotage operation.
2. The Taipei Port Branch Office uses the term “safety speeds” without speed limit in its controller’s operation manual to regulate ship navigation within the harbor, which may affect ship’s safe navigation within the harbor.
3. On the day of the occurrence, as the GODSPEED was entering Taipei Port, the pilot joined the crew on the bridge of the GODSPEED, the operations of bridge crew wholly showed a failure to keep proper look-out and use various techniques, knowledge, experience, and available resources to maintain awareness of their position and movements and those of surrounding vessels, and communicate effectively with the pilot to identify possible risks of collision. The processes showed the lack of literacy of GODSPEED on duty bridge crew in bridge resource management.
4. Since the implementation of the "Separation of Government from Enterprises" policy in year 2012, the VTS system was operated and managed by the TIPC. At this stage, domestic commercial ports do not have consistent operating standards. Controllers also have no consistent standard professional training and certification. Regarding the port arrival and departure of ships, it is unable to provide effective safety services to ships with the current powers, responsibilities and operational functions of VTS. For reasons of public safety, the operation and responsibilities of VTS should be the responsibility of a publicly-powered maritime administration agency.

Other

1. The Captain and crew of the GODSPEED had valid certificates issued by the flag state of the GODSPEED, and the pilot and crew of the Yonghua had valid certificates issued by the Maritime and Port Bureau of the Republic of China. On the day of the occurrence, at 20:00, the weather and sea state at Taipei Port met the standard for the GODSPEED to enter harbor.
2. After the occurrence, the pilot and the Captain, chief officer, third officer, and on-duty crew of the GODSPEED tested negative for blood alcohol concentration. No evidence indicated that alcohol was a factor affecting the crew on the bridge of the GODSPEED in their ability to navigate the vessel. The forensic report by the Ministry of Justice indicated that no factors related to alcohol or drugs influenced the Captain or crew of the Yonghua in their control of the vessel.
3. Before the occurrence, the maintenance record of the Yonghua contained no abnormalities, and after the occurrence, the engine operation and power test results were normal. In accordance with the Yonghua’s refueling record and the amount of fuel in the service tank, the possibility that the Yonghua lost power because of insufficient fuel or engine failure was eliminated.
4. The night of the occurrence, when the wreckage of the Yonghua was recovered from the water, the propeller and shaft were not entangled by fishing nets. The fishing nets that fell from the deck were originally stored in and fell out of the stern cabin. The possibility that the propellers were entangled in a fishing net, thereby causing the Yonghua’s engine to become temporarily stalled, was eliminated.