Stage

• On Scene
• Factual Collection
• Analysis
• Final Draft
• Closure

At 0025LT on April 26, 2022, the general cargo ship ROC-registered DA FA NO.1 with the gross tonnage of 331 and the Official No.013553, collided with a Liberian-registered oil tanker LIA with the gross tonnage of 42010 and the IMO number 9417751 at 16.2 nautical miles southeast of the Fugang fishing harbor, Taitung County, Taiwan. The DA FA No.1 was flooded and triggered a distress signal, then the DA FA No.1 sank at 12 nautical miles southwest of Green Island at about 0140 LT. All nine crew members of the DA FA No.1 were rescued by a vessel of the Coast Guard. The occurrence caused the DA FA No.1 to sink and the LIA to suffer damage to her hull at the bow; all crew of both vessels were unharmed and no pollution was reported.

Investigation Found

About Possible Causes
• 1. The 2nd officer of the LIA did not continue to monitor the DA FA No.1 with ARPA and AIS-related navigation equipment as she passed the bow of the LIA, failing to follow the requirement of the COLREG 1972 to always keep a correct look-out, missing the chance to take evasive action and being unable to actively and effectively prevent a collision at sea.
  2. The captain of the DA FA No.1 did not keep a proper look-out, suddenly turning to starboard to avoid the LIA without assessing the situation of the two vessels, ignoring the requirements of the COLREG 1972 on the look-out and causing the two ships to collide together.

About Risk
• 1. After the LIA’s 2nd officer spotted the DA FA No.1, the turn to port and slight adjustment of sailing direction did not meet the requirements of the COLREG 1972.
  2. When sailing in coastal waters, the 2nd officer of LIA did not maintain a CPA of at least one nautical mile with the DA FA No.1 as it passed, not meeting the requirements of the Onboard Management Manual, Master’s Standing Order and Bridge Order Record Log Book (Night Order) instructions.

Other
• 1. The visibility described by the DA FA No.1’s captain and the 2nd officer of the LIA differed. From the weather on the day, the investigation team judged that visibility was normal at the time of the occurrence and ruled out weather and sea conditions and visibility as factors in the collision.
  2. The rest hours of the LIA’s crew were normal, so duty crew fatigue was ruled out as a factor in the collision. There were no records for the rest of the DA FA No.1’s captain and duty crew; the investigation team was unable to analyze the captain’s human performance.
  3. The captain of DA FA No.1 with the qualifications of a 2nd officer (second-class) serves as a captain (third-class) following current Regulations for Seafarer Training, Examination, and Application for Certification.
  4. The relevant authorities allowed LIA to sail away from our waters before seeking the sought approval from the TTSB, which caused the investigators of the TTSB to spend a lot of time collecting evidence. Fortunately, the LIA’s country of registration and the ship owner cooperated with the investigation and provided interview letters and VDR data for the TTSB, which did not cause the relevant information to be inaccessible.