Stage

• On Scene
• Factual Collection
• Analysis
• Final Draft
• Closure

At approximately 0418 hours on December 13, 2023, the Taiwanese-registered fishery patrol ship Hsun Hu No.9 (gross tonnage 1859) collided with the Taiwanese-registered semi-container ship Ta Yang (gross tonnage 2496) approximately 4 nautical miles south of Qimei Island, Penghu County, Taiwan. There were no casualties or environmental pollution resulting from this occurrence.

Conclusions

Findings Related to Probable Causes
• 1. During its mission, Hsun Hu No.9 was patrolling in a north-south direction in the waters south of Qimei Island, Penghu County. While maneuvering to change direction, the on-duty personnel in the bridge failed to observe the movements of nearby vessels, maintain proper lookouts, or effectively use navigational equipment. Consequently, they did not detect that Ta Yang had entered the turning area of Hsun Hu No.9, leading to a collision where the bow of Hsun Hu No.9 collided with the starboard side of Ta Yang.
  2. The on-duty personnel in the bridge on Ta Yang noticed Hsun Hu No.9 ahead and took evasive actions despite being the stand-on vessel. Although Hsun Hu No.9 passed ahead of Ta Yang, it remained in the vicinity, yet Ta Yang did not maintain continuous monitoring. When Hsun Hu No.9 was 0.9 nautical miles off Ta Yang's starboard side, it initiated a port turn to reverse course, reducing the distance between the two vessels. In the four minutes leading up to the collision, the on-duty personnel in the bridge on Ta Yang were unable to detect the course change of Hsun Hu No.9 and did not take any collision avoidance measures, resulting in its starboard side being struck by Hsun Hu No.9.

Findings Related to Risk
• 1. Although the Coast Guard Administration has established training systems and subject matter for personnel at various stages of vessel operations, the on-duty personnel in the bridge of Hsun Hu No.9 were still unfamiliar with the use of navigational equipment such as radar and the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS). As a result, they were unable to effectively utilize these devices to assist with navigation, lookout, and collision avoidance, and did not demonstrate the full effectiveness of their training.
  2. Although Hsun Hu No.9 did not activate its Automatic Identification System (AIS) broadcast function due to the nature of its official duties, from the perspective of maritime safety, vessels in the vicinity had difficulty detecting its navigation status and intentions. This situation may increase the risk of a collision with other vessels.

Other Findings
• 1. Hsun Hu No.9 had not undergone Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) inspections or performance tests for over eight years since its manufacture, resulting in the failure to record and store very high frequency (VHF) radio communications, Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) data, or screenshots from the Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS).
  2. The crew of Hsun Hu No.9 was unfamiliar with and did not promptly save the Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) data. Additionally, relevant CGA personnel did not remind the crew to preserve the VDR data in a timely manner. As a result, the original data was overwritten during the incident, which impacted the investigation and analysis of the accident.