Stage

• On Scene
• Factual Collection
• Analysis
• Final Draft
• Closure

On May 20, 2024, the China-flagged container ship Hua Hang 1 with IMO No. 9388285, a gross tonnage of 6387, a length overall of 130.20 meters, a beam of 18.00 meters, and a container capacity of 664 TEU, contacted wharf No. 43 with its stern while departing from wharf No. 42 at the Port of Kaohsiung, causing damage to both the stern of the vessel and the wharf. No casualties or environmental pollution resulted from the occurrence.

Investigation Found

About Possible Causes
• 1. During the unberthing and turning maneuver at the Port of Kaohsiung, the pilot and the master of Hua Hang 1 did not adequately assess the distance between the vessel and the moored naval ship ahead as well as the wharf astern, nor did they monitor changes in the vessel’s dynamic status. Under these circumstances, the pilot ordered increased astern propulsion, resulting in Hua Hang 1 contacting the wharf at an astern speed of approximately 2 knots.
  2. The master and the pilot of Hua Hang 1 did not adequately conduct the Master/Pilot Information Exchange (MPX). The pilot did not proactively provide the pilotage plan, and the master did not verify key ship handling details. As a result, the pilotage was conducted without a shared understanding, affecting the accuracy of communication and decision-making during the maneuvering process.

About Risk
• 1. The pilot had a basic understanding of the core objectives of Bridge Resource Management for Pilot (BRM-P), but these principles were not applied in practice. During the pilotage, the pilot did not sufficiently collaborate and share information with the master and did not effectively use the bridge team to support the assessment of the vessel’s dynamic status and changes in distances to surrounding objects, which affected subsequent operational decisions.
  2. During this occurrence, the master of Hua Hang 1 did not sufficiently discuss the vessel’s turning operation and critical details with the pilot. As a result, key anticipated risks were not clearly communicated to the bridge team and the lookouts at the bow and stern. The bridge team lacked sufficient awareness of the vessel’s dynamic status during the critical phase of the operation and was unable to detect and respond to risks in a timely manner. These did not meet the Bridge Resource Management (BRM) requirements regarding the effective use of personnel and navigational equipment.
  3. The master and the officer of the watch (OOW) on the bridge did not comply with the relevant provisions of the Hua Hang 1 Safety Management Manual regarding port entry and departure operations. They did not enhance information exchange with the pilot to ensure consistency in the operational plan. When the master had doubts about the pilot’s intentions or actions, he should have promptly sought clarification, and, when necessary, control of the vessel should have been decisively resumed to ensure the safety of vessel operations.

Other
• 1. The bridge team members and the pilot of Hua Hang 1 all held valid certificates appropriate to their duties.
  2. The breath alcohol test result of the pilot on duty on the day of the occurrence was 0.00 mg/L.
  3. At the time of the occurrence, the steering gear, main engine, and navigational equipment of Hua Hang 1 were functioning properly.
  4. At the time of the occurrence, the weather at the Port of Kaohsiung was south-southwesterly wind at Beaufort scale 3, overcast skies, and good visibility.
  5. The pilot shift arrangement at the Port of Kaohsiung involved a high proportion of consecutive overnight duties, which could lead to cumulative fatigue due to insufficient restorative sleep. There was no relief or rotation control in place to ensure adequate rest opportunities following consecutive duties, increasing the risk of pilot fatigue during operations.